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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Marie DiFiore asserted claims against her former 
employer, CSL Behring, for retaliation in violation of the 
False Claims Act, and for wrongful discharge under a theory 
of constructive discharge in violation of Pennsylvania state 
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law. The False Claims Act (“FCA”) includes an anti-
retaliation provision for employee whistleblowers who 
engage in activity protected by the FCA. The District Court 
granted summary judgment to CSL Behring on the wrongful 
discharge claim because DiFiore had failed to show 
constructive discharge as a matter of law. For that same 
reason, the District Court did not permit DiFiore to argue that 
constructive discharge was an adverse action suffered in 
retaliation for protected activity. The FCA retaliation claim 
proceeded to trial. The judge instructed the jury that the FCA 
retaliation provision required that protected activity be the 
“but-for” cause of adverse actions against DiFiore. The jury 
found in favor of CSL Behring. DiFiore appeals the District 
Court’s jury instruction using the “but-for” causation 
standard, the grant of summary judgment, and one additional 
jury instruction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm and 
hold that an employee’s protected activity must be the “but-
for” cause of adverse actions to support a claim of retaliation 
under the FCA.  
I. 
A. Factual Background 
DiFiore worked for CSL Behring from 2008 until her 
resignation in 2012, first as an Associate Director of 
Marketing/New Products, and then, after a promotion in 
August 2011, as Director of Marketing. While at CSL, and 
particularly after her promotion, DiFiore became concerned 
about the activities of CSL and its employees in marketing 
drugs for off-label use and including off-label use in sales 
forecasts. Off-label use is the unapproved use of an approved 
drug, or the use of a drug for purposes other than those that 
have been approved by the FDA. The incidents that prompted 
DiFiore’s concerns included comments about off-label 
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marketing strategies, relationships with medical device 
manufacturing companies, and discussions about fines issued 
to another company for off-label marketing. DiFiore 
expressed her concerns to her supervisors, and she contends 
that CSL initiated a third-party compliance audit in part 
because of her complaints.  
DiFiore alleges that as a consequence of her protected 
conduct, she suffered the following six adverse employment 
actions, all of which took place after her promotion to 
Director of Marketing.  
1. January 2012 Warning Letter 
DiFiore and another employee, Allan Alexander, were 
both on the launch team for a new drug. In the first month of 
this team’s formation, DiFiore and Alexander clashed twice. 
In the first incident, Alexander and DiFiore had a 
disagreement over the telephone that culminated with 
Alexander abruptly hanging up on DiFiore. DiFiore 
complained to her supervisor about Alexander’s 
unprofessional behavior. In the second incident, DiFiore and 
Alexander had a disagreement at a team meeting that was so 
heated that the supervisor had to order a break. Afterward, 
DiFiore met with the supervisor and another manager to 
discuss her behavior, and DiFiore claims they “scolded” her. 
Subsequently, both DiFiore and Alexander received warning 
letters from Human Resources in January 2012. After this 
incident, CSL hired an employment coach, at a cost of about 
$45,000, to work specifically with DiFiore to develop her 
skills in leading the launch team.  
2. February 2012 Performance Review 
In a February 2012 mid-year performance review, 
DiFiore received “needing improvement” evaluations in 
several areas, including team leadership. Before her 
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promotion, she consistently received “strong” or 
“outstanding” evaluations. In response to this review, DiFiore 
wrote a letter expressing her belief that the criticism and 
lower ratings were due to her complaints about Alexander and 
her statements to auditors regarding compliance matters.  
3. February 2012 Warning Letter 
Also in February 2012, DiFiore received a warning 
letter regarding her nonpayment of her company credit card. 
The credit card company had canceled her card because it 
was more than 180 days past due. DiFiore stated in her 
deposition that this warning letter was “appropriate.” DiFiore 
did not know whether anyone in a similar situation was 
disciplined, but she believed that others had not received 
discipline for similar conduct. She offered no evidence to 
support that belief.  
4. Deteriorating Relationship with Supervisors 
in 2011 and 2012  
DiFiore claims that beginning in approximately 
October 2011, her relationship with her supervisors and other 
management began to deteriorate because of her protected 
activity. She alleged that one superior became “hostile,” 
started documenting her work activities, reprimanded her for 
complaining too much, and told DiFiore she was “too black 
and white” and that she needed to “understand shades of 
gray” as a supervisor. Another superior “completely avoided” 
DiFiore and refused to make eye contact in the hallway. Other 
supervisors criticized her during meetings that she was 
responsible for leading. DiFiore alleges that her supervisors 
“became ‘hypercritical’ of skills that had never previously 
been called into question.”  
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 5. Change in Duties in Early 2012 
In March or April 2012, DiFiore was removed from a 
committee. The parties dispute the significance of her 
committee participation as a job responsibility. Both parties 
agree, however, that her annual review included participation 
on this committee as an element of her overall job 
performance. She was also instructed to stop attending 
meetings with a particular drug manufacturer client.   
6. May 2012 Performance Improvement Plan  
In May 2012, DiFiore was placed on a Performance 
Improvement Plan (“PIP”). This plan extended the 
employment coach hired by CSL to work with DiFiore for an 
additional 45 days. The PIP identified the following areas for 
improvement: effectively leading her drug-launch team; 
improving communications and follow-up; developing 
effective plans; asking questions when unclear about 
assignments; submitting assignments in a timely manner; 
avoiding intrusion into others’ areas of responsibility; and 
demonstrating an ability to “navigate organizational 
dynamics.” Under the PIP, DiFiore was required to improve 
in the designated areas within 45 days or she could be subject 
to discipline up to and including termination.  
DiFiore argues that by placing her on a PIP, CSL 
indicated to her that she would be terminated. To support this 
assumption, DiFiore explains that of the 23 employees CSL 
identified as having been on PIPs since 2008, fourteen 
resigned. Of those fourteen, thirteen resigned without 
severance. Only four employees completed their PIP, and no 
employee at DiFiore’s level or higher had successfully 
completed a PIP. 
DiFiore received the PIP on a Monday. Two days later, 
she reached out to a supervisor and an HR employee and 
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requested a meeting to discuss an amicable separation. This 
meeting was scheduled for that Friday, but was canceled at 
the last minute without explanation. The following Monday, 
the first business day after the canceled meeting, DiFiore 
submitted her resignation letter.  
B. Procedural History 
DiFiore alleges that CSL wrongfully discharged her 
under Pennsylvania law and retaliated against her in violation 
of the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). After discovery, CSL 
moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted 
summary judgment on the wrongful discharge state law claim 
and held that DiFiore could not rely upon constructive 
discharge as an adverse action in her FCA claim. However, 
the court denied summary judgment on the retaliation claim.  
After briefing on the issue, the District Court issued an 
Order that it would instruct the jury that the FCA retaliation 
claim required “but-for” causation. At the conclusion of the 
jury trial, the judge instructed the jury on the adverse action 
element of DiFiore’s retaliation claim, instructing them to 
consider the totality of the circumstances and specifically 
listing four of the actions—the two warning letters, the mid-
year performance review, and the PIP—DiFiore alleged were 
adverse to her. 
The parties did not dispute whether the FCA applies or 
whether DiFiore engaged in protected conduct. Instead, they 
disagree over whether DiFiore produced sufficient evidence 
that the allegedly retaliatory conduct rose to the level of 
adverse action as required by the FCA.  
II. 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a). This Court exercises jurisdiction 
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. DiFiore presents three issues on 
appeal. First, she argues that the District Court applied the 
incorrect standard of causation for her FCA retaliation claim 
when it instructed the jury using the “but-for” standard of 
causation instead of the “motivating factor” standard. This 
Court exercises plenary review over whether jury instructions 
state a proper legal standard. Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 
109 F.3d 913, 929 (3d Cir. 1997). Second, DiFiore argues that 
the District Court incorrectly granted summary judgment to 
CSL on her claim of constructive discharge. We review the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 
Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 
2013). Third, DiFiore argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion when characterizing the alleged adverse actions in 
its instruction to the jury. We review for abuse of discretion 
whether jury instructions are confusing or misleading. 
Woodson, 109 F.3d at 929.  
III. 
A. The Causation Standard 
The District Court correctly applied Supreme Court 
case law when it instructed the jury using the “but-for” 
causation standard for DiFiore’s FCA relation claim. See 
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009); 
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 
(2013). Under the FCA’s anti-retaliation provision, an 
employee is entitled to relief if she was “discharged, demoted, 
suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner 
discriminated against in the terms and conditions of 
employment because of lawful acts” conducted in furtherance 
of an FCA action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1).  
The parties dispute what causation standard applies to 
the statutory language “because of” in § 3730(h). To prove 
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retaliation under the FCA, a plaintiff must show (1) that he 
engaged in protected conduct, and (2) that he was 
discriminated against because of his protected conduct. 
Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 186 
(3d Cir. 2001); U.S. ex rel. Hefner v. Hackensack Univ. Med. 
Ctr., 495 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 2007). The District Court 
ruled that DiFiore was required to show that her protected 
activity was the “but-for” cause of an adverse action, while 
DiFiore contends that a lower standard applies and she should 
have only been required to prove that her protected activity 
was a “motivating factor” in the adverse actions taken by 
CSL. 
DiFiore argues that this Court’s decision in Hutchins 
controls and compels the application of the “motivating 
factor” standard. 253 F.3d at 186. This argument fails because 
the language DiFiore relies on in Hutchins was dictum. Id. In 
Hutchins, we affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor 
of an employer on an FCA retaliation claim because the 
employee failed to prove that he engaged in protected conduct 
and that he had put his employer on notice of possible FCA 
litigation. Because he failed to meet these elements, we never 
applied the causation standard, which we recited in dictum as 
the “motivating factor” standard. Id. That dicta does not 
compel us to apply the standard here. 
Even if the “motivating factor” standard had been part 
of our holding in Hutchins, the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
decisions in two cases, Gross and Nassar, undermine the 
rationale for applying that standard. These intervening 
decisions would, in any event, allow us to reconsider contrary 
prior holdings without having to resort to an en banc 
rehearing. In re Krebs, 527 F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A 
panel of this Court may reevaluate the holding of a prior 
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panel which conflicts with intervening Supreme Court 
precedent.”).  
In Gross, the Supreme Court held that the ordinary 
meaning of “because of” in the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act required a plaintiff to prove that age was the 
“but-for” cause of the employer’s adverse action. Gross, 557 
U.S. at 176. The Court prefaced its analysis with the premise 
that “[s]tatutory construction must begin with the language 
employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary 
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative 
purposes.” Gross, 557 U.S. at 175. The Court went on to 
consider dictionary definitions of “because of” and explain 
that “the ordinary meaning of the ADEA’s requirement that 
an employer took adverse action ‘because of’ age is that age 
was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act.” Id. at 176. 
The Court therefore held that disparate treatment claims 
under the ADEA require a plaintiff to prove that age was the 
‘but-for’ cause of the adverse employment action. Id. at 180.  
After Gross, the Supreme Court again addressed 
causation standards in the context of retaliation claims. In 
Nassar, the Supreme Court held that the use of “because” in 
the Title VII anti-retaliation provisions requires a plaintiff to 
prove that the desire to retaliate was the “but-for” cause of the 
adverse employment action. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. at 2527–28, 
2533. The majority analyzed Title VII as prohibiting two 
separate categories of wrongful conduct and applying distinct 
causation standards to those categories. The first category—
status-based discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin—could be proven using the 
motivating factor standard because the language prohibiting 
this type of discrimination expressly required the lower 
burden. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a), (m) (“an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining 
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party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, 
even though other factors also motivated the practice”). In 
contrast, the language of the second category of prohibited 
conduct—employer retaliation on account of an employee 
having opposed, complained of, or sought remedies for 
discrimination—contains no language specifying the lower 
standard of motivating factor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
To interpret Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, the 
Court looked to its earlier decision in Gross for guidance. The 
Court held that the word “because” in the Title VII anti-
retaliation provision had the same meaning as the words 
“because of” in the ADEA. Consequently, Title VII 
retaliation claims require proof that the protected activity was 
the “but-for” cause of the adverse employment action. 
Nassar, 133 S.Ct. at 2533. In arriving at this conclusion, the 
Court also relied on traditional tort causation principles. It 
held that those principles apply to federal statutory claims of 
workplace discrimination because the “but-for” causation 
required for tort claims “is the background against which 
Congress legislated in enacting Title VII, and these are the 
default rules it is presumed to have incorporated, absent an 
indication to the contrary in the statute itself.” Id. at 2524. 
Against this background, the Court held that the motivating 
factor test only applied to status discrimination under Title 
VII because the language of the statute explicitly required it. 
Because such language was not present in the anti-retaliation 
provisions of Title VII, “but-for” causation applied. 
Here, the District Court concluded that it was 
compelled by Nassar to apply “but-for” causation to 
DiFiore’s FCA retaliation claim because of the “identical 
language” in the FCA, the ADEA, and Title VII. The court 
relied on Nassar’s logic and instructed the jury that DiFiore’s 
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protected activity must have been the “but-for” cause of any 
adverse employment action she suffered.  
The District Court’s reasoning was sound given not 
only the Supreme Court’s precedent, but also given our own 
case law addressing the effect of Gross and Nassar in the 
context of FMLA retaliation claims. In Egan v. Delaware 
River Port Authority, the plaintiff asserted a FMLA retaliation 
claim, 851 F.3d 263, 266–67 (3d Cir. 2017), urging that the 
district court should have given a mixed motive instruction, 
requiring less than “but-for” causation. The FMLA regulation 
at issue in Egan prohibited employers from considering the 
use of FMLA leave as a “negative factor” in an employment 
decision. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). We concluded that the 
regulation, “which uses the phrase ‘a negative factor,’ 
resembles the ‘lessened causation standard’ in [the Title VII 
prohibition against status-based discrimination] and it stands 
in contrast to the ‘because’ language in the ADEA (at issue in 
Gross) and Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision (at issue in 
Nassar).” Egan, 851 F.3d at 273. Based on this language, we 
applied a lessened causation standard requiring plaintiffs to 
show only that the use of FMLA leave was a “negative 
factor” in the adverse employment decision.  
Unlike the language of the FMLA anti-retaliation 
regulation, the language of the FCA anti-retaliation provision 
uses the same “because of” language that compelled the 
Supreme Court to require “but-for” causation in Nassar and 
Gross. For this reason, the District Court correctly instructed 
the jury that to find retaliation, it had to find that DiFiore’s 
protected conduct was the “but-for” cause of the adverse 
employment action.  
For the foregoing reasons, retaliation claims under the 
FCA require proof of “but-for” causation. We affirm the 
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District Court’s instruction to the jury employing that 
standard.  
B. Constructive Discharge 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must 
“do as the district court was required to do.” First Jersey 
Nat’l Bank v. Dome Petroleum Ltd., 723 F.2d 338, 338 (3d 
Cir. 1983). That is, we must determine whether the record 
contains any disputed issue of material fact, resolve any such 
issue in favor of the non-movant, and determine whether the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.  
DiFiore filed a state common law claim for wrongful 
discharge.1 Wrongful discharge requires that a plaintiff prove 
either actual discharge or constructive discharge. Because she 
was not discharged, DiFiore was required to prove 
constructive discharge. In addition to her state law claim, 
DiFiore asserts constructive discharge as an adverse action 
for FCA retaliation purposes. We conclude that the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of CSL on 
DiFiore’s wrongful discharge claim was proper, as was the 
District Court’s ruling that the grant of summary judgment 
foreclosed DiFiore’s argument that constructive discharge 
was an adverse action under the FCA. 
                                              
1 Under Pennsylvania law, the discharge of an at-will 
employee is a tort if it would violate a clear mandate of public 
policy. Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d 555, 562 (Pa. 2009). 
However, we need not reach the issue of whether there was a 
discharge in violation of public policy, because there was no 
“discharge” at all. DiFiore does not argue that she was 
actually discharged, and we conclude that she was not 
constructively discharged either. Rather, DiFiore resigned. 
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Under Pennsylvania law, constructive discharge occurs 
when working conditions are so intolerable that a reasonable 
employee is forced to resign. Kroen v. Bedway Sec. Agency, 
Inc., 633 A.2d 628, 633–34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Helpin v. 
Trustees of Univ. of Pennsylvania, 969 A.2d 601, 614 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2009), aff’d, 10 A.3d 267 (Pa. 2010). The concept 
of constructive discharge is essentially identical for retaliation 
claims under federal statutes: it occurs when “the employer 
permitted conditions so unpleasant or difficult that a 
reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.” 
Wiest v. Tyco Electronics Corp., 812 F.3d 319, 331 (3d Cir. 
2016) (brackets omitted). 
DiFiore failed to prove constructive discharge under 
both Pennsylvania law and federal law. In Clowes v. 
Allegheny Valley Hospital, we overturned a jury verdict and 
held that the employee was not constructively discharged 
when she alleged conduct that essentially amounted to close 
or even “overzealous” supervision. 991 F.2d 1159, 1162 (3d 
Cir. 1993). DiFiore complains of similar conduct. She may 
have been subjected to difficult or unpleasant working 
conditions, but these conditions fall well short of unbearable. 
Importantly, DiFiore did not sufficiently explore alternative 
solutions or means of improving her situation. She made no 
attempt to comply with the PIP. When a meeting to discuss 
the PIP was canceled, DiFiore chose to resign rather than 
reschedule. She prematurely abandoned her attempt to meet 
with CSL about the Performance Improvement Plan. She did 
not demonstrate that she had no option left but to resign. 
When the District Court decided that no reasonable 
jury could find that DiFiore’s working conditions were so 
intolerable that she was forced to resign, it correctly disposed 
of both her Pennsylvania wrongful discharge claim and her 
contention that a constructive discharge was part of CSL’s 
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retaliatory conduct under the FCA. We affirm the grant of 
summary judgment.  
C. Specific Jury Instructions 
We exercise plenary review over jury instructions for 
misstatements of applicable law. Franklin Prescriptions, Inc. 
v. New York Times Co., 424 F.3d 336, 338 (3d Cir. 2005). 
When considering whether an instruction is misleading or 
inadequate, however, we review only for abuse of discretion. 
Woodson, 109 F.3d at 929. As long as “the instructions are 
accurate in substance and understandable to lay persons, the 
failure to use the exact words requested by counsel is not 
reversible error.” Williams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d 1130, 
1134 (3d Cir. 1983).  
DiFiore contends that the District Court’s inclusion of 
four primary incidents in the jury instructions—the two 
warning letters, the mid-year performance review, and the 
PIP—may have confused the jurors and led them to believe 
that they were not permitted to consider evidence of other 
incidents beyond those four events. DiFiore’s argument fails. 
The District Court correctly instructed the jury that its 
determination should take into account the totality of the 
circumstances. The court instructed that the four events 
occurred “among other things,” and it described DiFiore’s 
allegation that her supervisors began to treat her in a hostile 
manner after she raised her concerns. These instructions do 
not misstate the law and do not mislead, prejudice, or confuse 
the jury.   
IV. 
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the orders 
of the District Court.  
